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ABSTRACT This study offers a sociological analysis of a student carnival in communist Czechoslovakia, 
the Majales in Bratislava and Prague in May 1956. Utilizing sources such as newspaper articles, photographs 
and witness accounts, this case study aims to reconstruct the conditions, meanings and consequences 
of Majales, employing a theoretical framework that highlights processes of communication between centre 
and periphery. It is argued that the Majales were facilitated by a destabilization of the symbolic centre, 
triggered by Stalin’s death in March 1953 and Khrushchev’s speech in February 1956. This set the stage 
for the students, who criticized the centre with subversive performances and playful demonstrations 
of dissatisfaction. Finally, the initial reception of the performances in the official media and the efforts 
of the state apparatus to control the meanings of Majales are discussed.
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Introduction
The year 1956 marked a turning point in the political, cultural and social history of Central 
and Eastern Europe. After Stalin’s death in 1953, a cultural thaw was already on the way, 
but it was only in 1956 that “de-Stalinization” fully took off. In this new situation, various 
social groups began to publicly voice their feeling of disillusionment with the political 
system of state socialism. The first major protest since the Pilsen and East German uprisings 
of 1953 was organized in Poznań in June 1956, but violently suppressed by armed forces, 
leaving dozens dead and hundreds wounded. At the end of October 1956, student gatherings 
in Budapest developed into a fully-fledged revolution that was quelled by the Soviet Army. 
The audacious attempts of Polish and Hungarian protesters seemed to have had no counterpart 
in neighbouring Czechoslovakia, at that time known as a fortress of Stalinism (cf. Skilling 
1977: 257). Unlike in Poland and Hungary, there was no violent uprising in Czechoslovakia 
in 1956. This does not mean, however, that the country was unaffected by the political climate 
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change. This article investigates a specific instance of public criticism in Czechoslovakia – 
the Majales in May 1956.
Majales are traditional student May celebrations, characterized by a carnivalesque 
ethos and subversive prankishness. In the second half of the 19th century, Majales emerged 
as a manifestation of the nationalist sentiments among Czech students. The tradition declined 
during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918−1939), but was revived by the communists 
after World War II. Majales were organized by the communist youth until the coup d’état 
in February 1948, after which they were prohibited (Pernes 2008: 141). It was not until 1956 
that once again Majales celebrations were held in Bratislava (May 12) and Prague (May 20). 
A newsletter from Bratislava’s Comenius University Naša Univerzita suggests that the idea 
to revive Majales came “from above” (10 May, 1956: 1), likely from the central organs 
of the state-controlled Czechoslovak Youth Union (Československý svaz mládeže – ČSM). 
Although the students were allowed to create their own placards and wagons, the student 
union tried to control the events by publishing guidelines in university newspapers as well 
as a brochure titled Ako pripraviť majáles [How to prepare Majales] (1956).
However, when the Majales crowd assembled in Bratislava, it seemed that many 
of the students had read altogether different literature. A group of students, dressed in lugubrious 
costumes, carried a coffin titled “Academic Freedom”, which they later threw into the Danube; 
others satirized Soviet architecture, the political situation and the declining quality of student 
life. A week later, the Prague Majales, which attracted approximately one hundred thousand 
onlookers (Petráň 2015: 243), featured even more subversive performances, including 
a young woman in chains, again representing “Academic Freedom”, pushed around by 
jailers. The students of the Theological Faculty carried a shelf of “libri prohibiti” (Blaive 
2001, non-paginated photograph), while a girl in a Pioneers uniform handed out copies 
of the Party’s history instead. Political slogans and farcical allegories were omnipresent, 
as was the secret police, which allegedly arrested people right on the spot (Matthews 1998: 31). 
Their presence was not left uncommented by students who were shouting: “Nebojte se, i policie 
jde s náma!” [“Fear not, even the police are with us!”] (Gruson 1956).
Despite being formally organized by the ČSM, hundreds of students entertained 
tens of thousands of onlookers with parodies and commentaries on the shortcomings 
of the Communist system. The Majales in 1956 became a significant event that attracted 
considerable public attention: “For the last two days, nobody in Bratislava has spoken about 
anything but the carnival parade. In the tram, on the street, the word is everywhere”, reported 
Ladislav Švihran for the newspaper Smena (1956). Why did the participants, all of a sudden, 
choose to criticize the Communist regime, and what cultural resources did they use to do so? 
And how did the state-controlled media and the political apparatus respond to this challenge?
Methodology and theoretical framework
This study of the Czechoslovak Majales in 1956 follows the principles of the “strong program 
in cultural sociology” (Alexander and Smith 2003) highlighting the importance of meanings 
and culture for social processes. We believe that a meaning-centred analysis of the Majales 
will shed light on similar subversive acts in the context of the Communist regime 
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in Czechoslovakia and, more generally, the Eastern Bloc. Protest events, like the Majales and 
the Velvet Revolution, are not triggered by economic conditions or the sheer lack of political 
freedom, but by shared meanings and cultural processes (cf. Alexander 2011). Drawing 
on Edward Shils (1961), we analyse the communicative dynamics in Czechoslovakia and 
the Eastern Bloc as interplay between centre and periphery of both symbolic and institutional 
structures. We show how a destabilized centre can engender performances in the periphery 
and how these performances are in turn interpreted by the centre and re-integrated 
in the central cultural system.
Historical ethnography
This study employs various types of data, including newspaper articles, photographs 
and witness accounts, to reconstruct the meanings of Majales. The findings of the only 
comprehensive study on the topic so far (Matthews 1998), which not only includes 
a minute description of the events but also several errors, are corroborated, corrected and 
supplemented using the memoires of participants (in Blaha 2007) as well as photographs 
documenting the events (Blaive 2001; Blaha 2007). Additional information on banners, 
slogans and performances were found in the digitalized archive of the Open Society Fund, 
including two interviews from 1956, conducted in Germany, with émigré eyewitnesses 
of the events (Interview 1; Interview 2) as well as two reports based on undercover interviews 
conducted with Czechoslovak citizens abroad (Report 1; Report 2). Whereas the interviews 
with the political refugees might have overemphasized the political dimension of Majales, 
the reports were likely distorted by the self-censorship of Czechoslovak citizens abroad. Both 
types of accounts of the Majales therefore had to be corroborated by other sources.
Our approach to the Majales parades was inspired by the historical ethnography 
of Andreas Glaeser, who criticizes ethnographers’ “fixation on the immediate spatial, 
temporal, and social context” (2010: 55) and proposes to reconstruct historical events 
on the basis of archival materials and interviews. We engage in a “thick description” (Geertz 
1973) of the events, focussing on their public meanings and cultural patterns. Although 
this is a meaning-centred analysis, we do not disregard political or economic factors, 
but simply insist that culture and meanings should be treated as “relatively independent” 
(Alexander and Smith 2003: 12).
Centre and periphery
After the coup d’état in February 1948, communists took over the Czechoslovak state 
institutions and effectively gained control of what Elaine Chan calls the “structural centre 
of society”, which “makes policy decisions, runs the daily operation of the administration, 
maintains law and order, and has monopoly over the use of force in society” (1999: 339). 
Alongside the institutional take-over, communists took control of the public sphere in order to 
erase any interpretation at odds with the officially sanctioned understanding of reality. In other 
words, the Communist Party tried to occupy the “symbolic centre” of Czechoslovak society, 
understood as a “set of values, beliefs, myths, symbols, rituals, festivals and memories” (Chan 
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1999: 339). Edward Shils spoke of “the central value system” as “the centre of the order 
of symbols, of values and beliefs which governs the society” (1961: 117). The farther we 
move from the centre of a society to “the hinterland or the periphery, over which authority 
is exercised, attachment to the central value system becomes attenuated” (Ibid.: 123). 
In his analysis of discursive transformations, Jacques Derrida argues that meaning 
systems are inherently unstable. At times, when the symbolic centre becomes “dislocated”, 
it loses its legitimacy and can no longer “orient, balance, and organize the structure” or 
“limit what we might call the play of the structure” (2002: 352). This corresponds to an 
observation made by Shils, who argued that the authority of the centre diminishes once 
it loses its connection to the sacred collective representations of a society (1961: 118). 
Once the symbolic centre is destabilized, the associated institutional structure loses its 
legitimacy too. If it is no longer able to control the flow of meanings in a society, free 
play – cultural appropriation, combination and permutation – ensues and may result 
in the creation of a supplementary sign replacing the former centre (Derrida 2002: 365). 
In other words, social order is suspended by “anti-structure” as the society enters a “liminal 
phase” (cf. Turner 1980), a stage of in-between-ness characterized by deep-seated ambiguity 
and high levels of anxiety (Szakolczai 2009). Liminal situations are often accompanied 
by an unusual upswing of creativity with transformative potential (Szakolczai 2009: 160). 
Nevertheless, it mustn’t be forgotten that in real-world politics there is also the central 
institutional power structure which can arrest much more than the “play of substitutions” 
(Derrida 2002: 365) and employ brute force to reinstate its control, as happened in Hungary 
in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Social performance
Drawing on the works of John Austin, Erving Goffman and Kenneth Burke, Jeffrey 
Alexander developed a theory of performance as the “social process by which actors, 
individually or in concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation” (2006: 
32). He identifies six elements of social performance, which to be successful performances 
must re-fuse (Ibid.: 33−36). Collective representations connect social performances to 
the cultural system and thus to the symbolic centre of a society. They can be further 
distinguished into background symbols, usually associated with the centre, and foreground 
scripts, translating symbols into directives for action, the staging of the performance as mise-
en-scène. Regarding the flow of communication, it can be argued that the performing actor 
represents the centre and the audience the periphery of the performance. Actors can either 
draw on a set of symbols associated with the centre, employ alternative symbols, or play 
subversively with the central meanings. Subversive readings on the side of the audience are 
also possible. The situation of actors who promulgate central values differs considerably 
from those attacking central values, not the least thanks to their privileged access to means 
of symbolic production and social power. 
As observed by Émile Durkheim (2008), and echoed in Shils’s and Young’s essay 
on the coronation of Queen Elizabeth (1953), public rituals and social performances are 
crucial for maintaining people’s attachment to the central value system. Ritual performances 
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permeated everyday life in Communist countries – from conspicuous May workers’ parades 
to repeated displays of the Soviet flag, and it was through them that the centre could exert 
control over the periphery. Although the majority of rituals were labelled “spontaneous”, they 
were, in fact, organized by the institutional centre, with participation often being compulsory. 
Reaching far into society, the central apparatus controlled and distributed the means 
of symbolic production and used its social power to approve, criticize and censor public 
statements.
At the periphery, where “the play of structure” (Derrida 2002) is more pronounced, 
especially in liminal times when the grip of the centre weakens, social performances take 
different shapes. During Czechoslovak Communism, counter-performances promoting different 
sets of meanings were usually hidden from the public ‒ and the eyes of the secret police. 
In comparison, subversive performances, which ironically played with central meanings, 
could entertain a higher publicity. Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) described medieval folk culture 
as a peripheral counter culture, subverting as well as supplementing the central culture 
of elites through its grotesque imagery. A performative expression of this folk culture 
is the carnival, in which a fictive counter-world is created and enacted. We believe that 
the Majales 1956 can be understood as such a carnivalesque performance.
Destabilization of the centre: the two deaths of Stalin 
How could the Majales emerge in a state of “total occupation of public semantic space” 
(Možný 1991: 27)? Shils would probably have suggested that students, a group that 
has a high proportion of “alertly intelligent” actors who feel at the same time distanced from 
and concerned with the centre, are structurally prone to protests (1961: 126). Indeed, students 
tend to occupy a “liminal” position at the periphery of society (cf. Turner 1980). Although 
most students are legally adults, they do not hold yet positions of power in the institutional 
order and are thus not regarded as “full” members of a society. Students occupy a transitory 
position, between children and grown-ups, which structurally relieves them from the duties 
of adult life and provides them with time and space to devise and engage in projects like 
Majales, while culturally there is a certain tolerance or even expectation of deviant student 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the liminality of the student status does not explain why events like 
Majales emerge at any given time and place. Moreover, from a cultural sociological point 
of view, such an explanatory strategy amounts to a reduction of culture to social structure 
(Alexander and Smith 2003). Even more importantly, it gives no answer to the question: 
Why did the Majales happen in this form at this specific moment in time? In reconstructing 
the social and cultural conditions under which the Majales 1956 took place, we have to 
turn our attention from peripheral Czechoslovakia to the institutional and symbolic centre 
of international communism, the Soviet Union.
Stalinism as political religion
Soviet-style communism, and Stalinism in particular, was a religion-like system permeating 
the everyday life of citizens: some of them true believers, more following acquiescently and 
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a few being heretics. Especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the symbolic centre in many 
Eastern European countries can adequately be described as “political religion”, a term coined 
by Eric Voegelin (2000). Voegelin argued that the modern process of secularization did not 
change the “political-religious symbolism”, but merely substituted the transcendent God 
with “contents of the world” (2000: 60). God did not simply disappear, but was symbolically 
decapitated (Ibid.: 64), which is particularly true for the militant atheism of communism.
It is usually a political leader who replaces God as the symbolic centre of society 
in the cultural systems of political religions. In the post-war Soviet and Eastern European 
context, this role was assumed, of course, by Joseph Stalin. Stalin’s symbolic influence 
was immense already in the days of World War II ‒ as Pavel Kohout confessed, 
“Stalin’s name was often the only beam of light in the darkness” (1956). After the war, 
Stalin was portrayed as saviour of the Soviet Union and Europe, which was used to legitimize 
the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. According to an early heretic Egon Bondy, 
the “enthusiasm for Stalinism, predominantly among youngsters, was massive” (2008: 
63). Cultural representations of Stalin were characterized by superhuman powers and 
extraordinary commitment, by veracity, intellectual farsightedness and love for humanity. 
The representation of peripheral leaders such as Klement Gottwald in Czechoslovakia 
followed the same pattern: like Stalin, Gottwald was reputed to know all the workers by name 
(Macura 2008: 105) and to sacrifice his own rest to watch over the sleep of the Czechoslovak 
nation (Ibid.: 114). 
In The Two King’s Bodies, Ernst Kantorowicz (1957) discusses the medieval 
distinction between the mortal body of the king and the enduring body politic, highlighting 
the fact that the death of a ruler is a critical event ‒ a problem that medieval political 
theology addressed with the conception of a continuous body politic. A similar problem 
exists in modern political religions, where the death of a leader is potentially destabilizing. 
The mummification of Lenin, Stalin, as well as Gottwald, can be reconstructed as attempts 
to preserve the mortal body of the deceased ruler to symbolize the continuous existence 
of the Soviet body politic. Due to his unprecedented centrality in the Soviet cultural system, 
the physical death of Josef Stalin triggered a process of cultural destabilization, whose 
shockwaves were felt at the periphery. It is no accident that proletarian riots in Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany took place in 1953, right after Stalin’s death.
Khrushchev’s speech and its consequences
Stalin was, however, kept alive symbolically (Macura 2008). Although the idolatry waned 
in the months following his death, he remained a strong element in the visual and textual 
canon of the communist authorities. After all, Stalin’s megalomaniac monument was built 
on Letná hill in Prague as late as 1955. Although the gradual decomposition of Stalinism 
began already in 1953, its collapse is marked by the 20th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, where Nikita Khrushchev gave his famous speech “On the Cult 
of Personality and Its Consequences” on February 25, 1956. 
With surprising frankness, Khrushchev (1956) described Stalin as an unscrupulous 
mass murderer who, with the complicity of “Beria’s gang”, terrorized and executed 
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millions of his countrymen including, importantly, good communists. Khrushchev, lacking 
the symbolic authority to castigate the idolized leader, called upon the only two figures above 
Stalin in the communist Parthenon – Vladimir Lenin and Karl Marx. The juxtaposition with 
Lenin served to highlight Stalin’s intellectual and moral shortcomings, while Marx, who gave 
early warnings of the “cult of personality”, was invoked to discredit Stalin as a communist 
and as a leader. Finally, Khrushchev attacked the myth of Stalin as a military genius, 
central to his legitimacy in the domination of Eastern Europe, arguing that his military 
incompetence led to the economic devastation of the USSR and a high wartime death toll. 
Khrushchev’s iconoclastic speech was a symbolic decapitation of Stalin as the central figure 
of the communist cultural system. Furthermore, with Stalin being portrayed as madman, 
the communist system itself was exculpated for decades of terror (cf. Kołakowski 1981). 
Khrushchev was certainly not the first to criticize the “cult of personality” (cf. 
Kołakowski 1981: 450), but he was among the few capable of delivering a powerful 
performance. At least partially, “the authority in the language comes from the outside” 
(Bourdieu 1991: 109), the institutional position of the speaker. As General Secretary 
of the Party, Khrushchev could castigate the beloved Stalin and thus to recode the central 
symbolic system. And even more, he succeeded in delivering an authentic performance, 
as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for example, saw in it a “genuine movement of heart” (cited 
in Kramer 2008: 71). Despite the fact that Khrushchev’s “secret speech” was performed for 
an audience of trusted delegates, never broadcasted and only published in 1989, its talking 
points spread quickly around the Eastern Bloc, as well as the whole world (Blaive 2001: 
70−83). In the following weeks, news of the symbolic coup d’état in the centre reached 
the peripheral countries of the Eastern Bloc.
Khrushchev’s speech attacked Stalinism, which was still the dominant political religion, 
particularly in Czechoslovakia, where show trials took place even after Stalin’s death. We 
know that members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party were familiarized with the speech 
on April 10 (Petráň 2015: 232). After that, elements of the speech appeared in the press and 
new signifiers started to emerge in the discourse. This cultural transformation became evident 
during the 2nd Congress of Czechoslovak Writers (April 22−29, 1956), where several speeches 
echoed Khrushchev’s critique of Stalin. The expression “cult of personality” was widely 
used, although it seldom referred to Stalin directly. It was mostly employed to delegitimize 
particular literary strategies (e.g. the idealization of a single proletarian figure) or to criticize 
the general organization of society. “Cult of personality” became a symbolically polluted 
signifier with shifting meanings that quickly entered the public repertoire of criticism. During 
the Congress, covered by the official media, writers like František Hrubín, Vítězslav Nezval 
and Jaroslav Seifert cautiously addressed the regime, demanding abolishment of censorship 
and freedom for jailed authors. Khrushchev’s performance, as it turned out in the end, had 
serious unintended consequences – it threatened the legitimacy of the communist system 
as a whole.
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Majales as carnivalesque performance and semiological guerrilla
When the shockwaves of Khrushchev’s speech hit Czechoslovakia, students were already 
protesting against a new law issued by the Minister of National Defence, which forced 
university graduates to enlist for the standard two-year military service. The protests started 
on the evening of January 17, when students in Bratislava dormitories spontaneously gathered 
and sung, in pyjamas, an improvised protest song (Marušiak 2007: 17). The student movement 
gained traction in the following months, and by the time of the 2nd Congress of Czechoslovak 
Writers, students around the country held public meetings and drafted “resolutions” 
criticizing censorship, the estrangement of political elites and their nation’s mimicking 
of the Soviet Union. Initially, the Ministry of Education was inclined to recognize the student 
resolutions as legitimate (Marušiak 2007: 20), but the party leadership insisted that they 
should be regarded as bourgeois anti-establishment provocation (Ibid.: 21). 
In this political and cultural climate, the state-controlled Czechoslovak Youth 
Union organized the first Majales since 1948. As a whole, the 1956 Majales parades 
in Bratislava and Prague were quite heterogeneous. Aside from salient political satire, hundreds 
of participants came in costumes referring to their field of study, while others paid tribute to 
the authority of the structural and symbolic centre, for example law students from Charles 
University carrying the banner: “Děkujeme dělnické třídě, že nám umožnila studovat!” [“We 
thank the working class for an opportunity to attend the university!”] (Matthews 1998: 30). It 
is reported that the audience burst out laughing upon reading the banner. In times of cultural 
crisis, such a flagrant expression of belief in the centre seemed grotesque. Although not all 
participants engaged in political protest, a significant number did. The Majales might have 
been less provocative than many onlookers and participants expected (Gruson 1956; Holler 
1956; Matthews 1998), but they contained nevertheless dozens of individual performances 
that subversively thematized life in communist Czechoslovakia. 
Historical allegories and references  
As pointed out by Durkheim (2008), social groups and societies have their own understanding 
of time. They have their “beginnings”, zeniths and nadirs that create a “frame of reference” 
(Merton and Sorokin 1937: 623) which allows actors to understand their own place 
in the world. Textual or visual references to history were among the most common tropes 
at the Majales parades. Some were harmless, such as folk costumes signifying an indefinite 
national past. However, many referred to more specific pasts, real or imagined, offering an 
unfavourable juxtaposition of the Communist regime with different historical epochs. 
Even prehistory appeared as a trope in the Prague parade, represented by two groups 
of students costumed as cave-dwellers. According to the newspaper Mladá Fronta (May 
22, 1956: 1) the first group carried a banner demanding “K vyšší užitkovosti mamutů!” 
[“Towards higher productivity of Mammoths!”]. The second group carried a large model 
of a dinosaur (Matthews 1998: 28). On its side was written: “Jsem nezranitelný. Mám 
kůži minist. školství!” [“I am invulnerable. I have Minist. of Education’s skin!”] (Blaive 
2001, nonpaginated photograph), which by its abbreviation referred to both, the minister 
and the ministry. Its opposite side read: “Pro studentskou mensu” [“For student cafeteria”] 
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(Matthews 1998: 28). Although prehistory did not belong to the eras that were normatively 
coded in the communist discourse, both scenes carried a political message. The trope 
of prehistory not only portrayed the existing communism as underdeveloped, but also 
problematized the very idea of historical progress, which was central to the communist 
cultural system. Finally, the comment on the “skin” of the Ministry of Education addressed 
the perceived intransigence and insularity of the state apparatus.
At least two salient performances in Prague thematized the Medieval Age. An 
executioner with an axe was accompanied by several students carrying a large wooden 
block with a depiction of human head and a banner reading: “Neposlouchal” [“He did 
not obey”] (Report 1). The figure of the executioner pointed to the contradiction between 
the self-representation of the state apparatus as modern and progressive and the actual 
practices it employed to discipline the periphery. The term “neposlouchal”, moreover, 
refers to a situation where children break the rules set by an adult authority. As such, 
the scene symbolized the regime’s infantilization of the students, as well as the draconian 
punishment for trivial deviances from the norm. The second performance featured a group 
of students dressed as monks (Matthews 1998: 27), carrying a sign: “Vzhůru k novým 
vzdělávacím metodám!” [“Towards new educational methods!”] (Blaive 2001, non-paginated 
photograph). Here, the contemporary educational system was likened to the Dark Ages. 
The effect of the allegory was created by the tension between the declarative wish to improve 
the education system and the historicizing visuals. The new educational reform was presented 
as already outdated and based on obsolete ideological schemes that could just as well have 
come from the Dark Ages. As one of the student-monks said, “we had had about four 
serious educational reforms in less than eight years, and people were bored with it” (cited 
in Matthews 1998: 28).
An unfavourable juxtaposition with the Age of Enlightenment was implied with a banner 
in Prague criticizing the backwardness of the educational policies of the communist regime: 
“Co Komenský vytvořil, to Kahuda zničil” [“What Comenius created, Kahuda destroyed”] 
(Report 1). The new reform of the Ministry of Education (led by František Kahuda) 
was portrayed as violating the principles of John Amos Comenius, an Enlightenment scholar 
well known for his advocacy of non-restrictive and creative education. The students claimed 
that the current education policy was not able to reach the standards set three hundred years 
earlier.
Finally, there were references to capitalist modernity, the constitutive Other 
of the communist cultural system. In Czechoslovak media, capitalist societies were portrayed 
as haunted by poverty and lack of solidarity, which was contrasted with the alleged camaraderie 
and abundance of socialism. While in socialism the people were free, in capitalism they 
were slaves. The theme of slavery was picked up by students in Bratislava, who, stylized 
as serfs, pulled an old steam-engine car with ropes. On its side hung a banner that read 
“Cvičná jazda ministerstva školstva!” [“Ministry of Education’s driving lesson!”] (Interview 
1). The vehicle’s vintage design juxtaposed the practices of the Ministry of Education and 
the enslavement of the proletariat in factories. The combination of the term “driving lesson” 
and the old car suggested, again, the regime’s lack of flexibility. The enslaved students had 
to pull the Ministry of Education and progress, not thanks to, but in spite of the official 
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institutions. The subversive message of the historical allegories at Majales can be summed up 
by a socialist joke according to which “existing socialism” is a dialectical synthesis of history: 
“from the prehistoric classless society it took primitivism, from antiquity slave labor, from 
medieval feudalism ruthless domination, from capitalism exploitation ‘and from socialism 
a name’” (cited in Žižek 2014).
Lived experience and official discourse
Whereas the historical allegories used images of an imagined past to illuminate the present, 
other performances contrasted the lived historical experience with the distorted historiography 
of the communist regime. Often, students alluded to events in the recent past, which they had 
or could have witnessed themselves. For example, several students in Bratislava decided to 
recall the darker side of the Soviet liberation by walking in two parallel columns – one dressed 
in Red Army uniforms, the others as demonized US servicemen. Whereas the Americans 
marched calmly with guns in their hands, the Soviets acted drunk and shouted: “Eau-de-
Cologne – vodka! Pitralon – vodka!”1 (Matthews 1998: 22). This performance problematized 
the official representations of Soviets and Americans, the former being portrayed as drunkards 
who intoxicate themselves with aftershave and the latter appearing sober and ready to strike. 
While such portrayal was clearly at odds with the central system of collective representations, 
it surely resonated with the audience, many of whom had witnessed drunken Red Army 
personnel in the streets of Bratislava a decade earlier. The allegory was also a synecdoche, 
the soldiers standing for the respective powers blocks and begging the question: Why 
have we pledged allegiance to the side that is worse off? Such a critical stance towards 
the Soviet Union became widespread among students in 1956 and many student resolutions 
in the months preceding Majales contained the demand to remove symbols of the USSR from 
public spaces (see Matthews 1998: 41).
The Stalinist show trials were also thematized in several performances. “Pán 
Karnevalista” [“Mr. Carnival”], a student dressed in bear pelt, and “Prokurátor Grandpapulós” 
[“Attorney General Big Mouth”] engaged in “show” trials against those who refused to 
take part in the preparation of the Majales or obstructed the process (Marušiak 2007: 23). 
It was a grotesque portrayal of the gruesome show trials, which just had begun to surface 
in the official media. A group in Prague carried a banner asking the following questions: 
“Co je lepší? Popravit male zločince a nechat ty velké na svobodě? Nebo popravit ty velké 
a nechat malé, aby je nahradili?” [“What is better? To execute small criminals and let the big 
ones go free? Or execute the big ones and let the small ones take their place?”] (Matthews 
1998: 30). While enigmatic, it clearly referenced the show trials. However, in contrast to 
Khrushchev, the students did not say that the executed were innocent but rather implied that 
nobody in the political apparatus was. Either the executed were criminal kingpins and those 
who were in charge now were only small criminals or it was the other way around.
1 Pitralon was a popular Czechoslovak aftershave.
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Another banner in Prague, “My studenti jsme sice mladí, ale dost si pamatujeme” 
[“We, students, might be young but we remember a lot”], was a performative 
commentary on the Orwellian practice of the central political apparatus to manipulate 
the representation of the past for the sake of ideological consistency. Despite their youth, 
the students claimed to see through the regime’s attempts at manipulating the recent past. 
A similar point was made by students carrying a cage, which was signed “Na indexu” 
[“On the index”] (Blaive 2001: non-paginated photograph) and accompanied by a girl 
handing out copies of the Party’s history. Finally, a peculiar reference to the recent past 
was a banner reading: “Nebojte se Pražáci, ještě jsou tu študáci!” [“Fear not, people 
of Prague – the students are still with you!”]. The official media where particularly unhappy 
with this one – “Is there anything the people of Prague fear?” asked Josef Holler in Mladá 
Fronta (1956). Interestingly, the slogan was a performative time machine: a banner with 
exactly the same text was carried in the last Prague Majales in 1948 in support of the 
Communist Party. While the banner expressed continuity with the protest tradition, its 
meaning had changed dramatically. It implied that there was still something to be afraid 
of ‒ the central state apparatus, from which the students had broken free, at least in their 
performance.
Concerns about the freedom of the press were expressed by a group of Prague 
students, who, each in black and with keys in their mouths, carried a banner “Jsme redaktoři 
Mladé fronty!” [“We are the editors of Mladá Fronta!”] (Interview 1). The feeling that 
the reality represented in the media, not only historical but also contemporary, was not 
genuine and that information was being manipulated was voiced also in the chant “Každé 
malé dítě ví, co Mladá fronta nepoví!” [“Every kid knows what Mladá fronta would 
never say!”] and the banner “Mladá fronto 1956: kde jsou naše resoluce?” [“Mladá fronta 
1956: Where are our resolutions?”] (Blaive 2001, non-paginated photograph). Scenes and 
banners addressing the recent past and the present situation were predominantly based 
on the implicit contradiction between lived experience and official discourse as promulgated 
by the communist party.
Subversive performances as semiological guerrilla
The humour of performances was often produced by a subversion of the official language. 
The students developed two major strategies for such subversion. One was purely textual, 
the other was achieved through a combination of textual and visual elements. The textual 
subversion was realized as follows: Slogans combined two conflicting sentences, as for 
example in the Prague banner: “Ať žijí korejští studenti – ale za své!” [“Long live Korean 
students – but on their own money!”] (Matthews 1998: 29). The first part of the slogan 
was typical for the language of the central power structure, thus creating an initial ambiguity. 
The second part added a peripheral supplement, which subverted the original message, 
criticizing the financial support for North Korean students in Czechoslovakia. In other 
cases, the subversive supplement to the official message wasn’t explicitly mentioned, which 
meant that the decoding of the message relied entirely on the reading of the audience. 
This is exemplified in the Prague slogan “Ať vzkvétá aparát ČSM – opora naší práce!” 
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[“Let the apparatus of the ČSM flourish – it is the base of our work!”] (Svatoš 1999). Such 
enthusiasm for a bureaucratic apparatus encouraged an ironic reception.
The effect of the combination of visual and textual elements, on the other hand, 
relied often on their incongruity. During Bratislava Majales, the students carried a banner 
“Sovietsky zväz – náš vzor!” [“Soviet Union – our model!”] (Marušiak 2007: 26) alongside 
a deformed replica of Soviet Lomonosov University. The textual element referred to 
central collective representations, expressing the loyalty of peripheral Czechoslovakia to 
the sacred centre of international communism. However, the meaning was subverted by 
the visual dimension of the performance. The deformed replica functioned as synecdoche, 
suggesting not only that Lomonosov University was an unsuitable example to follow, but 
the Soviet Union in its entirety. A similar logic was employed by another performance 
in Bratislava: an emaciated student led by others, dressed as cooks, carried a placard 
“Stravujeme sa v Raji” [“We eat in Paradise”] (Interview 2). “Raj”, the Slovak term for 
Paradise, was an abbreviation for “Restaurace a jídelny” (“Restaurants and cafeterias”), 
the state monopoly which managed, alongside other institutions, student cafeterias. 
The humour resulted from the confrontation of the presumably harsh reality of student life and 
the reference to the ideal realm. The perceived absurdity of the discourse was demonstrated by 
a subversion of its own language, a technique which Umberto Eco (1998) calls “semiological 
guerrilla warfare”. What Czechoslovak students externalized through the conflict of meanings 
in their banners and allegories was a discrepancy between the everyday experience and its 
representation in the official discourse. 
A sophisticated example of a subversion of the official language was performed by 
a group of students in clown costumes in Bratislava addressing the ongoing Race of Peace 
between Prague, Berlin and Warsaw (Marušiak 2007: 136). Instead of bicycles, the clowns 
rode scooters they kept falling off, while shouting “Hromadný pád, naša záchrana!” 
[“Collective fall, our rescue!”] (Interview 2). Each time one of them fell, a clown following 
the group helped him to his feet with a remedy – a glass of liquor from a demijohn he 
pushed on a cart. The top of the cart carried a placard “Náš záväzok: Nebudeme poslední!” 
[“Our promise: We won’t end up last!”]. The allegory presented an international event that 
was supposed to be a dignified athletic celebration of peace and brotherhood as a drunken 
clownery. The referent of the scene was, however, more general. The placard on the cart 
mimicked the official language of the central institutional system. Communist systems 
in the entire Eastern Bloc had a culture of promises and vows, in which institutions, teams and 
individual workers made public promises to improve their job performance. Such symbolic 
acts confirmed the society’s orientation towards the future, a key element of the central 
symbolic system. The students mocked these vows. Instead of being first, the drunken cyclist 
clowns could promise at best not to finish last. The use of the central symbol of the vow 
extended the referent of the allegory to society as a whole. The declarative public ritual 
was presented as a farce in the context of a grotesque reality. According to the drunken, 
disorganized clowns, the only way out was a collective fall. Not, of course, a fall from 
the scooter, but the fall of the regime. However, the students’ diagnosis of disorganization did 
not apply to the whole society. After the Majales carnival, the communist authorities got 
organized and made a concerted performative effort to quell the agitated student movement.
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The centre strikes back: meaning-control after Majales
In times of a cultural crisis, the message of the students, cheered by thousands of onlookers, 
threatened the centre’s control over the periphery. However, the meaning of public events 
is never ready-made, but involves a process of meaning-making in which the exercise of “social 
power” (Alexander 2006: 36) plays a crucial role ‒ a power wielded mostly by the official 
media, which were, in communist Czechoslovakia, controlled by the political centre. In our 
case, the exercise of social power can be treated as a (counter-) performance staged by 
the centre to impose its interpretation of the events and promote its own symbols and values.
First reports – Masks are allowed everything! Or not?
On Monday after the Bratislava Majales, May 14, the Slovak newspaper Smena published 
an article by Ladislav Švihran (1956) titled “Maskám je všetko dovolené!” [“The masks 
are allowed everything!”]. Its author provides a first-hand account of the events, stating that 
“Saturday’s carnival was a spontaneous, unforced entertainment for both those in the parade 
and their audience” and claiming that “nobody speaks of anything but the carnival parade”. 
Švihran, however, presents Majales mainly as a critique of higher education reforms and 
student living conditions. Nonetheless, he admits that the “sharp criticism did not miss 
any aspect of our life” referring specifically to the clownery of the “Race of Peace”. 
Interestingly, Švihran mentions the “collective fall” on the placard, but omits the subversive 
continuation, “our rescue”, reported by the refugee in Munich (Interview 2). On the same 
day, the newspaper Práca also published an article appreciative of the student carnival: 
“Bratislava has not seen such an event in a long time” (May 14, 1956: 2). Although most 
of the criticism was “correct”, the author raised concerns, as some masks and performances 
“were surely not what the organizers expected” and the critique of Soviet architecture was, 
in his opinion, simply “mistaken”.
Both reports, written and published before any official interpretation of the event 
was established, were positive, but cautious. While the report in Smena wilfully understated 
the political implications of some performances, the piece in Práca pre-emptively criticized 
the students’ attack on the Soviet Union, a sacred element of the symbolic centre. Although 
both authors approved of the student carnival, they cautiously maintained a symbolic 
distance, which exemplifies the centre’s control through self-censorship. Furthermore, 
already the day after Majales, the political apparatus tried to control its message directly. 
Švihran remembers (2007: 108) that the day before the publication of his article, his editor-
in-chief was visited by a mysterious man, supposedly an employee of the Secret Police. 
Consequently, the text appeared only in the Bratislava edition of Smena, in an attempt to limit 
the flow of information about Majales to other regions of the country. 
Although the political message of the Prague Majales was even more pronounced, it 
was conspicuously missing from newspaper reports, none of which appeared in the Slovak 
part of the country. The day after the parade, Večerní Praha described the Majales as “funny 
and satirical” (May 21, 1956: 1) and mentioned the support of the rector of Charles University. 
A similar article appeared in Rudé Právo, the main communist newspaper (May 21, 1956: 1). 
A day later, the youth daily Mladá Fronta portrayed it as a completely apolitical festival. 
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According to the article “Nejen chlebem, ale i legrací živ je člověk” [“Man needs not only 
bread but also fun”] (May 22, 1956: 1), crowded cafeterias were the students’ major concern. 
This time, it seems, the political apparatus was prepared and took control of the meanings 
of Majales immediately.
An altogether different festival was observed by Sydney Gruson (1956), a New 
York Times reporter who published on May 26 an article titled “Prague festival lampoons 
regime”. Despite being in the midst of the Cold War, Gruson offers a surprisingly balanced 
account. While describing the critical performances, he argued that “no effort was made 
to turn the occasion into a huge anti-Communist demonstration, as had been rumoured 
in Prague”. Gruson was, as a foreign reporter, entangled in a different structure of power 
than Czechoslovak journalists and could draw on a different set of signifiers and frames 
in his re-construction of the event. The New York Times, his employer, was not dependant 
on the goodwill of the central political apparatus. Another Western report, in Life magazine, 
attested that “students poked pointed fun at everything that had happened to academic life 
in eight years of Communism” and “were tinkering recklessly with (the) new freedom” 
(June 4, 1956: 54−55).
The party is/takes over 
At the end of the month, the framing of the Majales began to shift. On May 25, the Prime 
Minister, Viliam Široký, could still say that “the students have the right to express their 
opinion aloud and we have the right to say what we agree with, and what not” (1956: 2). 
But one day later, the tone of the reports started to change. Josef Holler wrote in Mladá 
Fronta (May 26, 1956: 4) that despite “the abundance of healthy ideas and good caricatures”, 
the Prague Majales were “in some cases used to promulgate mistaken ideas” and “it 
is surprising that students, who in large part come from proletarian and peasant families, 
accepted some wrong demands so easily”.
In a similar vein, Milan Ferko stated in Kultúrny život (May 26, 1956: 1) that he 
initially supported the student activities in early 1956 but that the recent events were 
a “product of political reaction”. To support his claim, the author discussed the sophisticated 
information infrastructure maintained between the student cities, suggesting that “aero-
taxis” delivered Prague resolutions to Bratislava ‒ an often-repeated assertion and likely 
a product of Communist propaganda (Marušiak 2007: 27). Furthermore, he castigated 
the idea of Majales as “nonsensical” and “hysterical”. Nevertheless, Ferko maintained that 
“the majority of students [...] did not fall prey to the elements of political reaction”. While 
the author was harsh on the Majales, he tried to salvage the message of the student resolutions, 
creating a symbolic opposition between the two. This symbolic opposition was echoed 
in other articles that had a favourable view of the early student activities (Jelínek 1956; 
Mňačko 1956). On May 27, Práca published a concluding article called “Po týždni vzruchu” 
[“After a week of excitement”] (May 27, 1956: 2), in which readers were assured that 
the student party was over, “the exam period will begin shortly” and that the students were 
now “united in their support for the Party resolution”.
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A further shift in the interpretation of Majales was marked by the 10th Congress 
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, June 11−15, 1956. In his introductory speech, 
President Antonín Zápotocký defended the Party’s control of the press, which the students 
had criticized: “We have always refused the freedom of the press and we decidedly refuse it 
now as well” (Rudé Právo, 12 June, 1956: 6). Zápotocký claimed that “recently, reactionary 
elements attempted to abuse the critique our party consciously develops with regard to our 
life and to mix with the students. These attempts failed”. The Secretary of the Party, Václav 
Kopecký, seconded his statement by rejecting student demands for academic freedom 
as political reaction claiming that students had let “themselves be seduced” (Mladá Fronta, 
15 June, 1956: 2). 
On June 11, the state-wide Party periodical Rudé Právo informed its readers that Božena 
Plchová and Jaroslav Hájíček were arrested for the distribution of student resolutions (June 
11, 1956: 3). The protagonists were portrayed as déclassé bourgeois who drafted the student 
resolutions inspired by broadcasts from Radio Free Europe. Three days later, Mladá Fronta 
published a report titled “Zneškodnění skupiny výrobců ‘studentských resolucí’” [“A group 
of ‘student resolution’ producers arrested”] (June 14, 1956: 5), which left no doubt that there 
never had been any genuine student demands. František Kahuda (Literární noviny, June 23, 
1956: 3) followed this line, arguing that while “the majority of students supports the Party 
and the Government”, there were some opinions “aimed against the interest of our state, 
against our People’s Democracy”, which shows that “many replaced the Leninist legacy [...] 
with political humbug”. According to him, the Majales were simply a “sign of indifferent 
class consciousness, of lack of Communist ethos”. Kahuda identified the enemy, stating 
that “(responsible for Majales) were not the older students whose social structure is more 
favourable thanks to the higher percentage of working class students”, but the youngest, who 
were admitted due to a supposedly more relaxed cadre policy.
By the time of the Hungarian revolution, in autumn 1956, the interpretation of Majales 
as the “product of reaction” was already firmly entrenched and partially attributed to 
the “low ideological-political standard of university students and teachers” (Marušiak 2007: 
45). Consequently, the admission process was tightened as universities were told to accept 
“the children of capitalist, or formerly capitalist families only in exceptional [...] cases” 
(Marušiak 2007: 60).
The state apparatus employed two distinct strategies to control the meanings of Majales. 
First, there was a geographical meaning-control (or censorship), which prevented the news 
from reaching broader audiences. By restricting the flow of information from the epicentres 
of Majales to the geographical periphery, the interpretations of the event were spatially 
arrested and its impact was successfully minimized. Second, there was also meaning control 
(often due to self-censorship) regarding the content of the message. At first, Majales were 
discursively constructed as an unpolitical children’s play. This was followed by a smear 
campaign that drew on the infantilised image of the students as misled by reactionary 
provocateurs, who were quickly identified as members of déclassé middle and upper class 
families. Thus, the events could be fully integrated into the central cultural system, embedded 
in the communist narratives of class conflict, progress and reaction. Even the Czech student 
in Italy, interviewed by an informer, argued that “the manifestation was organized ‘from 
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above’ to prove that ‘de-Stalinization’ is already making change [...] but later fascist and 
capitalist powers attempted to take control over the manifestation and because of that it 
degenerated” (Report 2). Finally, not only meanings were arrested, but also the alleged 
provocateurs. Students who actively participated in Majales were often expelled, or had their 
studies suspended (Marušiak 2007: 51−55).
 
Conclusion
The Majales in Bratislava and Prague were not motivated by poverty, low housing quality 
or crowded cafeterias ‒ despite some specific concerns voiced by students. They arose at 
a time when the symbolic centre was destabilized and the state apparatus lost its grip over 
the periphery. Majales were part of wider unrest in the Eastern Bloc that reached its apex 
in the Hungarian uprising. We have argued that this cultural destabilization was triggered by 
the death of Stalin, and culminated in his symbolic decapitation by Khrushchev. In this liminal 
situation, Majales emerged as a subversive performance, building on the momentum of an 
existing student movement demanding educational as well as social and political reforms. 
Although many expected the carnival to turn into an anti-regime protest, the students 
employed more subtle genres of criticism, reminiscent of medieval carnivals. Behind 
the seemingly harmless masks, however, were also political activists that subverted the official 
rituals of the Soviet-style Communist Party as well as its entire organizational culture. They 
targeted critical issues such as unrealistic economic promises, personalization of guilt instead 
of systematic self-criticism, and persistent distortion of information in the public media. 
Some went even further and criticized the entire symbolic system the Communist Party 
was supposed to represent. These performances were engendered by the semiosis process that 
underlies every creative symbolic act, breaking free from the cultural system, which thus far 
had arrested it.
Right from the outset, the structural centre attempted to control the interpretation 
of Majales. The flow of information was restricted and its importance was reduced to 
mere entertainment. Later, however, the Party itself intervened and recoded Majales 
as a reactionary plot. This allowed the political centre to assert its authority by embedding 
the student carnival into broader societal narratives of ongoing class struggle. Furthermore, 
such an interpretation legitimized disciplinary measures against students and was used 
to justify a change in the university admission procedures favouring the working class. 
The Majales in Bratislava and Prague in 1956 were creative bursts of protest quickly quelled 
by the structural centre. Nonetheless, they were symptoms ‒ among others ‒ of the cultural 
transformation in communist Europe, which did not return to its former Stalinist practices but 
pursued a programme of population control through other means. Majales, banned after 1956, 
re-emerged in the 1960s, again a time of cultural upheaval, in grand style – with the beatnik 
poet Allen Ginsberg elected as King Majales in 1965.
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